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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal, state, and local governments are currently pursuing
ambitious programs to upgrade and integrate their information
technology systems into unified data networks. These proposals
promise to make vast holdings of data far more accessible to
government officials and to the general public. The rapid advance of
technology, however, proceeds upon a framework of privacy
regulations designed for the insular information systems of the past.
The thesis of this paper is that advances in information technology are
outpacing the law's protections for personal privacy, and that new
safeguards for privacy, due process, and substantive rights need to be
incorporated into law to meet the challenges brought on by
heightened access to personal data.
This paper focuses extensively on privacy issues in the State of
Connecticut. Connecticut has proposed a massive program to
overhaul the isolated databases of its various agencies and transform
them into an integrated state-wide data network. Connecticut's
proposal, originally intended to be executed through a $1.5 billion
privatization contract, is now slated to proceed under the auspices of
the state's Department of Information Technology (DOIT).1 This
paper considers in detail the way in which the proposed technical
changes will require that new privacy protections be incorporated into
law.
Part I of this paper highlights current trends in information
technology, with an in-depth focus on the Connecticut initiative to
integrate and privatize its information services. Part HI provides a
framework for considering the privacy interests of individuals in
public data, and the qualitative distinctions among different means of
disclosures. Part III, the primary thrust of the document, provides a
detailed description of the various channels of information disclosure,
including Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosures, non-FOIA
1. See Jon Lender, State Begins Talks for Billion-Dollar Privatization Effort, HARTFORD
CouRANT, Dec. 31, 1998, at A3; Matthew Daly, Rowland Scraps Privatization of Computers,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 30, 1999, at Al.
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disclosures, and interagency disclosures.
II. ARCHiTECTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS: DATABASES TO DATA
NETWORKS
Government agencies have commonly stored data in isolated
systems before attempting to integrate it into more global systems.
The State of Connecticut, for example, long relied on multiple,
isolated computer systems within a given agency.2 It has repeatedly
consolidated portions of its information technology systems, either
unifying the databases of individual agencies, or creating computing
environments shared by a small number of government entities?
A current trend in information technology is to link the
databases of government agencies into jurisdiction-wide networks
that allow for the common holding of data These "common
information repositories" may be housed at various levels of the
network, such that certain information may be accessible at the state
level, other information can be obtained at a more limited enterprise
level, and other information would be restricted to an agency-specific
level.5 Information is organized at state, enterprise, or agency levels
as dictated by concerns about security, management responsibility,
and access requirements.6 The "Statewide Infostructure," that is
being created in Connecticut, connects agencies to one another and
reduces the redundancy and cost of more traditional database
management systems
The transformation to an integrated, jurisdiction-wide data
network requires that value judgments be made about the privacy
concerns of individual bits of information. By assigning data to a
more general level of access, the state can reduce the redundancy of
data collection as well as the associated costs of maintaining separate
databases. Simultaneously, the state makes personal information
more available to government officials, as well as to the public.
The State of Connecticut is currently pursuing a massive
proposal to overhaul its information technology services and create
this Statewide Infostructure. The state engaged in extensive
2. See State of Connecticut Strategic Plan for Information Technology (visited Oct. 8,
1999) <http:llwww.doit.state.ct.us/StrategicPlan.htm>.
3. See id., figs.2-3.
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negotiations with a private firm to outsource the project for an
estimated cost of $1.5 billion over seven years. 8  Negotiations
terminated in June 1999 over pricing and labor disputes, but the state
has resolved to continue with the program through its internal
Department of Information Technology.9 If successful, this massive
undertaking will revolutionize data handling practices in Connecticut
and set a standard for the remainder of the states. Since it is taking a
leadership role with its privatization plan, Connecticut must address
privacy issues from the start to ensure that privacy protections are
hardwired into the architecture that is ultimately selected.
Connecticut's plan, while technically ambitious, proceeds upon a
set of data privacy laws designed for the insular systems of the past.
The privacy protection provided by the legislation that enabled the
privatization initiative are based upon existing privacy laws, with no
attempt to modify the state's data laws to confront the challenges
posed by improved technology. 0 Existing law primarily addresses
the release of discrete amounts of sensitive data to the public, and
does not account for interagency disclosures and disclosures of
aggregations of data that will be made possible as advances in
technology permit the integration of public data in a unified data
network.
III. PERSONAL INTERESTS IN PUBLIC DATA
Individuals have a number of different personal interests in the
information the government holds. While the term "privacy" may be
generally ascribed to all of these interests, they can be differentiated
into more particular concepts.
A. Notions of Privacy
One kind of privacy interest that individuals have is an interest in
personal security and safety. Access to government data can facilitate
the misdeeds of others by making available potential victims'
personal information, such as their addresses, Social Security
numbers, and medical records." The harm is ultimately not one of
8. See Daly, supra note 1.
9. See id.
10. See Act of June 18, 1997, 1997 Conn. Acts 97-9 (Spec. Sess.).
11. For example, actress Rebecca Shaeffer was shot and murdered when a lunatic fan
acquired her address through the motor vehicle records held by the State of California. See W.
Kent Davis, Drivers' Licenses: Comply with the Provisions of the Federal Driver's Privacy
Protection Act; Provide Strict Guidelines for the Release of Personal Information from Drivers'
Licenses and Other Records of the Department of Public Safety, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 196, 196
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privacy, but of other more serious and even criminal offenses that can
be committed easily through access to personal data.
Second, individuals have due process interests in the proper
handling of their data. As discussed below, government agencies are
increasingly sharing public data between themselves. While such
data exchanges can be a boon to governmental efficiency, they
increase the risk that officials will act on erroneous data. Absent
independent checks to verify the authenticity of matched data,
agencies risk depriving individuals of their due process rights when
they take adverse action based upon erroneous data.
Third, individuals have more abstract interests that are best
described by the term "informational privacy." This term defies an
easy definition, but it may be generally described as the desire of
individuals to limit the kinds of information that others know about
them. Informational privacy interests extend beyond concrete harms
to personal security or safety, and implicate those disclosures of
personal data that simply reveal information that would not otherwise
be known.
B. Qualitative Differences in Data
Governments collect a vast array of personal data. Some data,
such as tax and medical records, are extremely sensitive and have
long been recognized as sources of concern for the privacy interests
of individuals. Other sources of personal information are quite
innocuous when considered in discrete amounts, although they can be
compiled and matched to create broader profiles of individuals that
are invasive of personal privacy. Because governments hold a
spectrum of data about their citizens, public databases are especially
attractive sources of information for people seeking to generate
information profiles of others. 12
(1997). Similarly, pro-choice workers are often targeted for violence by anti-abortion activists
who take down their license plate numbers and find their home addresses through the registries
held by state motor vehicle departments. See, e.g., Andrea Estes, Feds Probe Abortion Foes'
Mailing; Planned Parenthood Workers Were Targeted at Their Homes, BOSTON HERALD, Feb.
28, 1997, at 1. In addition, IRS workers have repeatedly been found to sell confidential tax data.
See Robert D. Hershey Jr., Snooping by I.R.S. Employees Has Not Stopped, Report Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A16.
12. This information includes voting records, motor vehicle records, public housing
records, records relating to professional and recreational licenses, schooling records,
unemployment records, library circulation records, and divorce records.
1999]
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C. Distinctions Among Data Recipients
Governmental disclosures of personal information can also be
differentiated according to the identity of the recipient. Personal data
is often disclosed by governments to the general public. Information
may also be disclosed among government entities, either within a
given jurisdiction, or between jurisdictions. This practice is
becoming increasingly common with the creation of integrated data
networks.
The differences between sensitive and profiling data, and
between governmental disclosures to the public and governmental
disclosures among government agencies give rise to four general
categories of governmental disclosures: (I) disclosure of sensitive data
to the public; (II) disclosure of profiling data to the public; (II)
disclosure of sensitive data between government entities; and (IV)
disclosure of profiling data among government agencies. Most laws
have focused upon the first kind of disclosure, with states having
elaborate regulatory schemes designed to restrict the disclosure of
sensitive data to the public. As advances in technology increasingly
permit the release of profiling data to the public and the disclosure of
sensitive data among government agencies, existing data laws will
provide less of a measure of security for the privacy interests of
individuals.
IV. CHANNELS OF DISCLOSURES
The replacement of isolated databases by integrated data
networks stands to lead to a dramatic increase in the quantity of
personal data that is disclosed by the state, both to the public and to
other governmental agencies. This Part will detail the existing
channels by which governments disclose personal data, and will
describe the likely impact of new information technology systems
upon the nature of such disclosures.
A. FOIA
State and federal governments are mandated to disclose records
to the public pursuant to the freedom of information acts (FOIAs) of
their respective jurisdictions. FOIAs commonly have three
components. First, they provide that all records maintained or kept by
public agencies shall be public records available for public inspection
or copying. Second, they create categories of exemptions, such that
exempted records are not required to be disclosed. Third, they
stipulate how non-exempt public records are to be disclosed to the
PUBLIC DATA AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
public. FOIAs will be sharply impacted by current developments in
information technology. As advances in data management systems
improve access to public records, far greater amounts of personal
information stand to be disclosed to the public.
1. Goal of FOIA: Transparency of Government
Every state, as well as the federal government, has its own FOIA
that dictates the scope of information that is open to public
inspection. 13 The goal of FOIAs is to promote efficiency and fairness
in government by rendering it transparent to the citizenry. The
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to
ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors
accountable to the governed."' 4 James Madison articulated the basic
principles behind FOIAs when he stated that "the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other
right.' 15 FOIAs have repeatedly served as important tools to expose
bad practices of government. 6
2. Tension With Privacy Interests
FOIAs have prompted a decades-long, well-chronicled tension
between the goals of public disclosure and the privacy interests of
individuals. FOIAs create a presumption that all public records,
including those containing personal information, shall be available for
public inspection.17 Records can only be withheld from public
disclosure upon a determination that the information falls within one
or more of the enumerated FOIA exemptions.' 8 These exemptions are
frequently construed narrowly to give full effect to the goal of
providing full disclosure of records relevant to the public interest.
Connecticut is no exception. The Connecticut Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that "the general rule under the Freedom of
13. For a compilation of various privacy laws from all fifty states, see Bruce D. Goldstein,
Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An Examination of State
Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMoRY L.. 1185 (1992).
14. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978).
15. 6 WRrTINGs OF JAMES MADISON 398 (1806), reprinted in Note, Access to Official
Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.. 209, 212 (1952).
16. See, e.g., Landmark Legal Foundation (visited Oct. 8, 1999)
<http://www.landmarklegal.org/landmark/irs.cfm> (exposing politically motivated tax audits).
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(a) (West Supp. 1999).
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b) (West Supp. 1999).
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Information Act is disclosure with the exceptions to this rule being
narrowly construed. The burden of establishing the applicability of
an exemption clearly rests upon the party claiming the exemption."' 9
The Connecticut FOIA exempts disclosure of "[p]ersonnel or
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute an invasion of personal privacy." 20  Connecticut courts,
however, have construed this exemption narrowly and have permitted
disclosure of personal data when legitimate public interests can be
advanced through disclosure of contested records. Personnel and
medical files, for example, can be withheld from disclosure only
when "the information sought by a request does not pertain to
legitimate matters of public concern and is highly offensive to a
reasonable person."'2' Records relating to public employees are
presumptively matters of public concern, and courts frequently
override the personal information exemption of FOIA in order to
disclose information about how public agencies function.22
The Connecticut Supreme Court found that society's interests in
institutional transparency trump personal privacy interests in the
context of tax delinquency records. In State v. Freedom of
Information Commission, the Court mandated that tax delinquency
records be disclosed to the public.23 Tax records are ordinarily
covered by stringent privacy protections. 24 The court, however, ruled
that tax delinquency lists, which contain the identity of the debtors
and the amount of their delinquencies, are public records. The court
noted that the public has a strong interest in "knowing whether the
burden of public expenses is equitably distributed and whether public
employees are diligently collecting delinquent accounts."25
The Connecticut FOIA has also trumped privacy protections in
the legislature. In 1976, Connecticut enacted a global privacy law
that prohibited disclosure of personal data absent an individual's
permission. 6 The law contained few exceptions, 27 and it granted a
19. Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 635 A.2d 783, 787 (Conn. 1993) (quoting New
Haven v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 535 A.2d 1297, 1301 (Conn. 1988)).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
21. Perkins, 635 A.2d at 791.
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See State v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 441 A.2d 53, 56 (Conn. 1981).
24. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-15 (1993 & West Supp. 1999).
25. See State v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 441 A.2d 53,54 (Conn. 1981).
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-191 (1977 & West Supp. 1998) (repealed 1979)
("No agency or any of its employees shall disclose or transmit any personal data to any other
individual, corporation or municipal, state, or federal agency without the consent of the person,
except as provided in enumerated exceptions.").
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private right of action to individuals whose data were wrongfully
dislosed.2
The personal data law, however, clashed with the goals of the
Connecticut FOIA. Whereas the Connecticut FOIA mandates that
personal information, with narrow exemptions, be disclosed to the
public, the personal data law created a private right of action against
agencies that disclosed such information. Agencies found themselves
legally liable under the personal data law for conduct they were
required to perform under the Connecticut FOIA.29 Recognizing the
inherent tension between the personal data law and the state's FOIA,
the Connecticut legislature repealed the personal data law.30 Mitchell
Pearlman, the present Executive Director of the Connecticut Freedom
of Information Commission, was actively involved in the 1979 repeal
of the personal data law, and states that the two sets of laws were
antagonistic and impossible to mutually enforce.3 1 Privacy laws in
Connecticut are now limited to certain procedural safeguards,32 the
privacy exemption of state's FOIA,33 and miscellaneous privacy
provisions that are scattered throughout the general statutes as
discussed below.
FOIAs establish a bias in favor of disclosure of information to
the public, particularly in Connecticut. Connecticut's FOIA imposes
enforceable legal liability upon agencies that do not disclose their
public records. Powerful interests often seek disclosure of public
records through Connecticut's FOIA, and frequently litigate their
claims when agencies deny disclosure. To block disclosure of
privacy-related records, the burden falls on the agency to show that
the record falls within the personal information exemption to the
state's FOIA. Not only must the agency show that the record qualifies
as a "personnel or medical or similar file[]," but the agency must also
demonstrate that the privacy interests at stake outweigh the public
interest in disclosure, and that the disclosure would be "highly
27. The exceptions to the privacy law were limited to intra-agency disclosures, disclosures
necessary to prevent physical harm to the data subject, disclosures otherwise permitted by
statute, and disclosures made pursuant to subpoena. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-191 (1977
& West Supp. 1998) (repealed 1979).
28. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-197 (West Supp. 1998).
29. Telephone interview with Mitchell Pearlman, Executive Director, Connecticut
Freedom of Information Commission (March 18, 1999) (on file with authors).
30. Public Act No. 79-538, 1979 Conn. Acts 79-538 § 2 (Reg. Sess.).
31. Pearlman interview, supra note 29.
32. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-193 (1998 & West Supp. 1999).
33. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
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offensive" to a reasonable person?34  Since there is often a
presumption in favor of disclosure, 35 the withholding agency has a
strong burden to overcome. Moreover, there are no global privacy
laws in Connecticut that impose affirmative limits on the disclosure of
personal data. Additionally, agencies may be particularly prone to
disclose personal data since the individual concerned is generally not
a party to the FOIA dispute. These factors create an institutional bias
in favor of disclosing personal information to requesting parties.
3. Ad Hoc FOIA Exemptions
As discussed above, the Connecticut FOIA has a general privacy
provision written into the heart of the act. The provision exempts
"personnel and medical and similar files" from the disclosure
requirements of the act when their disclosure "would constitute an
invasion of personal privacy. 36 The state legislature commonly
reconfigures the scope of the state's FOIA by adding exemptions for
some records or by expressly relegating other classes of information
to the public domain. These provisions are scattered throughout the
provisions of the Connecticut FOIA, resulting in a patchwork quilt of
privacy provisions. Although the general privacy provision quoted
above is useful as a starting point for addressing various privacy
disputes, the real scope of the Connecticut FOIA is determined by
hundreds of individual provisions that spell out in detail what records
may be subject to public disclosure. Many of these laws are
catalogued in the appendix. 37
The language of the various provisions suggests the political
nature of the Connecticut FOIA. While the names of the holders of
most professional and recreational licenses are fully subject to
disclosure, Connecticut law makes a number of exceptions. Holders
of licenses for firearms and assault weapons, for example, receive an
exemption.38 Information about the activities of hunters, trappers, and
commercial fishermen also receives special protection.39 In contrast,
personal data is fully disclosed for sex offenders. The State of
Connecticut makes available the names, addresses, photos, and
34. See Perkins, 635 A.2d at 787,790.
35. Records of public employees, for example, are presumptively covered by FOIA. See
id. at 790.
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
37. The appendix is located at <http://www.xmlaw.com>.
38. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-28 (1990 & West Supp. 1999), see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-202d (vest Supp. 1999).
39. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-42, 67a, 157b (1990 & West Supp. 1999).
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criminal histories of resident sex offenders, all searchable on the
Interet.40
For certain classes of data other than personnel and medical data,
the legislature goes beyond the protections afforded by routine
Connecticut FOIA exemptions and adds additional provisions that
further restrict the legality of disclosing the data. Performance
evaluations of judges, for example, are afforded utmost protection.
Any information disclosed to members of the judicial department is to
be used by such members "only for the purpose for which it was
given and shall not be disclosed to any other person."41 More than
merely prohibiting disclosure of the data to the public, as does a
normal FOIA exemption, this provision prohibits the disclosure of the
data to anyone outside the judicial evaluation committee.
4. Mechanics of Disclosure of Public Records Under
FOIA
The first step of the Connecticut FOIA, as discussed above, is to
divide the universe of public information into exempt and non-exempt
records. The second step of the Connecticut FOIA is to make the
non-exempt records available to the public. This latter step is being
revolutionized by current advances in information technology
services.
The Connecticut FOJA has traditionally provided for two
methods of disclosing non-exempt records to the public. Citizens can
inspect and photocopy public records at the site of the agency holding
the information. This method imposes obvious burdens of time,
travel, and money upon requesting individuals. Alternatively,
requesting parties can obtain Connecticut FOIA releases by
correspondence. A requesting party can mail a request to the
Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC), stipulating what
information is desired. This method of disclosure can be particularly
cumbersome, however, if the requestor does not know precisely
which documents she seeks. Moreover, this process is expensive.
Connecticut law permits charges of $0.25 (for state agency
information) or $0.50 (for local government agency information) per
page photocopied. Expansive searches can be quite costly, both in
terms of time and money. These transaction costs, undesirable as
40. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-251 to 54-254 (West Supp. 1999). The
Connecticut on-ine sex offender registry is available at Connecticut Department of Public
Safety Sex Offender Registry (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http:llwww.state.ct.usldps/Sor.htm>.
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-40a (1988 & West Supp. 1999).
1999]
94 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.16
they are, create an artificial barrier that restrains the disclosure of
personal data. Legally non-exempt personal data becomes
suppressed, de facto, when the transaction costs of disclosure are
considered.
5. FOIA and the Internet
Advances in information technology will revolutionize the
mechanics of FOIA disclosures. The State of Connecticut is currently
in the process of uploading many of its public records onto the
Internet. 42 Connecticut's registry of convicted sex offenders, for
example, is freely accessible on-line, and can be searched by name,
town, or zip code.43
Questions immediately arise as to what type of information and
how much information should be uploaded onto the Internet. If the
courts or the legislature have ruled that a category of records is
subject to FOIA, then what justification remains for preventing the
records from being posted? Is there a public interest in maintaining
the existing slow and tedious system for processing FOIA requests?
Arguably, the slowness of the present system is one of the best
safeguards for the privacy interests of individuals.
If FOIAs are interpreted as a mandate to upload all non-exempt
records onto the Internet, then the primary effect of FOIAs will
diverge from their original goal of promoting transparency of
government. FOIAs will increasingly serve to bring other people's
public action and inaction to public light. For example, tax
delinquency records, as discussed above, have been construed in
Connecticut to be non-exempt public records for the purposes of the
state's FOIA.44  The state can promote the transparency of
government by posting tax delinquency records on the Internet to air
its tax enforcement practices and to show that its policies are fair and
non-discriminatory. The predominant effect of such use of the
Internet is likely to be the social stigmatization of those who are
delinquent in paying their taxes. If the public data is valid and an
individual is truly delinquent in his taxes, then perhaps society will
benefit by having such an electronic forum. Fear of being recognized
by one's neighbors as a tax evader may be a better means of ensuring
equitable tax collection than by relying on government enforcement.45
42, See Act of June 18, 1997, 1997 Conn. Acts 97-9 (Spec. Sess.).
43. See supra note 40.
44. See State v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 441 A.2d 53, 56 (Conn. 1981).
45. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
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Posting non-exempt public records on the Internet can abridge
people's interest in informational privacy. People may
understandably want their public actions to remain anonymous.
Whether society should recognize this interest in anonymity is a
difficult question. People generally hold an interest in having a blank
slate and starting fresh in the wake of past mistakes. If all public
information is posted on the Internet, this will serve to create a
permanent record that will mark people for life, depriving them of an
opportunity to restart their lives with a blank slate. It is unclear the
extent to which society should recognize individuals' interests in
leaving their public actions anonymous. This information has been
deemed by the courts and the legislature to be a matter of public
record, so why should it be only accessible through the cumbersome
mechanics of today's FOIA procedures? The challenge is to discern
whether the state should recognize notions of informational privacy
such that certain non-exempt records should be withheld from the
Internet. To do so, the state may craft, as it has done in the past, ad
hoc exceptions to the general rule in favor of posting non-exempt
records on-line. This can be an effective means of preventing the
posting of discrete collections of information, but this method runs
the risk of granting special treatment to politically favored groups.
Alternatively, the courts and legislature can attempt to redraw the line
between exempt and non-exempt records to discourage disclosure of
personal data. This approach may be problematic, however, in that it
will require the reformulation of decades of case law, and will
suppress the release of certain information that has been heretofore
available under FOJAs. Neither approach is desirable, and the best
policy may be to make all non-exempt records available over the
Internet.
If all non-exempt records are posted on the Internet, various
procedural safeguards need to be implemented to ensure that the
publicly posted information is both current and accurate. People
should be informed when their personal data is to be posted on the
Internet and should have the opportunity to correct any false or
misleading information. Government, moreover, should be required
to purge old data that is not essential to its mission. These procedural
rules have long been part of Connecticut law, having survived the
repeal of Connecticut's personal data law.46 Adherence to these
SETTLE DIsPuTEs (1991) (asserting that social coercion can be more effective than legal
coercion).
46. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-193 (1998 & West Supp. 1999).
1999]
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provisions is of critical importance as personal data becomes ever
more widely available in the digital age.
B. Non-FOIA Disclosures
Federal and state governments engage in many disclosures of
personal data that cannot be justified under FOIA. These disclosures
are not seen as a way to promote the transparency of government, but
rather as a means to facilitate private-sector interests. By making
available useful data that would only be available on a piecemeal
basis through other sources, governments can reduce transaction costs
of private-sector endeavors. Such disclosures do not promote
efficiency or fairness of government and are frequently made without
any involvement by the Freedom of Information Commission.47
Rather, these disclosures are made by individual agencies pursuant to
deliberate policy choices as a means of facilitating private-sector
interests.
The public stands to benefit from such disclosures insofar as
private services can be made more readily available. Privacy
concerns, however, are readily apparent. While individuals are often
required to submit personal information to the government, they
generally lack the authority to prevent the government from
disclosing their personal data.
1. Driver's License Data
Most state motor vehicle departments sell, or otherwise disclose,
driver's license data to private-sector interests. 48 These data include
people's names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and
photographs.49  The State of Wisconsin, for example, generates
roughly $8 million annually from the sale of driver's license data.50
The State of Indiana sells driver's license data, along with motor
vehicle registration records and other information, directly over the
Internet." Driver's license records and registration records cost $5.00
a piece.52
47. See Letter from Mitchell Pearlman, Executive Director, Connecticut Freedom of
Information Commission, to Steve Carlson (May 20, 1999) (on file with authors).
48. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-10 (West Supp. 1999).
50. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998).
51. See Access Indiana Premium Services Page (visited Oct. 21, 1999)
<http://www.accessindiana.com/premiumindex.html>.
52. See id. To comply with Indiana privacy law, requestors must click upon a category of
permissible uses for the data, although it is not clear if there is any way to monitor the use of the
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The sale of driver's license data provides a revenue source that
can help state agencies adopt streamlined information technology
systems that are useful to the general public.5 3 Arguably, the
opportunity to generate revenue through the disclosure of driver's
license data provides an incentive for states to improve their
telecommunications systems and make services available to the
general public.
The practice of selling driver's license data, however, raises
serious privacy issues that have engendered strong opposition and
congressional rebuke. Many people do not want their residential
information listed in public directories. People have a legitimate
interest in having their residential information kept separate from the
public sphere and commonly forego being listed in public directories.
This privacy interest may simply be one of not wanting others to
know where they live, or may be more deeply rooted in concerns for
personal security and safety. People lose this privacy interest when
state motor vehicle departments disclose driver's license data absent
individuals' consent.
2. The Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act
State disclosures of driver's license data received substantial
press in light of the violence facilitated by their release. A California
actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, was murdered at her home after a lunatic
fan procured her address through the local department of motor
vehiclesm In response, Congress passed the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), which has been replicated in Connecticut and
in other states nationwide. 55
The federal DPPA prohibits unrestricted disclosures of driver's
license data, but preserves the ability of state motor vehicle
departments to serve as clearinghouses of information for third
parties. The DPPA creates a broad prohibition on disclosure of
personal data contained in motor vehicle records to any person or
entity.56 The DPPA then enumerates permissible uses of such data.
Many of the enumerated uses pertain to issues of motor vehicle safety
and theft.57 Other uses are far broader in scope. The DPPA, for
data. See id.
53. The Indiana system, for example, provides an information framework for public
services throughout the state. See id.
54. See Davis, supra note 11, at 196.
55. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1999).
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a) (West Supp. 1999).
57. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
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example, permits the disclosure of driver's license data to any public
official for use in carrying out public functions 8 The DPPA also
allows disclosure of data to private firms "in the normal course of
business" to verify or correct existing data.59 In addition, the DPPA
permits state motor vehicle departments to disclose their data for bulk
distribution of marketing surveys and solicitations if individuals have
an opportunity to opt-out.60 The permissible uses enumerated in the
DPPA leave the law, in the wording of the Eleventh Circuit,
"riddled... with more holes than Swiss cheese."61 The DPPA is
dubiously enforceable, moreover, as circuits are split on whether the
DPPA is an impermissible encroachment on state sovereignty. 62
3. Connecticut's Driver's Privacy Protection Act
The DPPA, and its state law analogs, may serve to lull citizens
into thinking that their personal data will be shielded from disclosure.
The Connecticut DPPA requires that all applicants for drivers permits
have the opportunity to prevent their driver's license information
from being disclosed.63 All such applications must contain the
following notice:
NOTICE: Personal information collected by the Department of
Motor Vehicles may not be disclosed to any person making a request
for a motor vehicle record in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (c) or (d) of section 14-10 of the general statutes unless
you indicate your consent to disclosure. Do you wish to allow
disclosure under such circumstances? Yes () No ( )64
On its face, this notice appears to assure people that their driver's
license data will remain secure from disclosure. Indeed, absent the
driver's consent, the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles is
prohibited from disclosing the data to most people who appear at the
Department in person.65 The notice, however, does not allude to the
fact that, despite the refusal of license applicants to permit disclosure
of their data, the Department remains free to disclose their personal
58. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(12) (West Supp. 1999).
61. Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11" Cir. 1999).
62. See Steven C. Carlson, Comment, State Sale of Driver's License Data Sparks Debate
over Federal Privacy Law, 1 YALE SYMP. ON L. & TECH. 7, U 4-6 (Spring, 1999)
<http://Iawtech.law.yale.edu/symposium/99/Commentl-carlson.htn>.
63. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-10 (West Supp. 1999).
64. Id.
65. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-10(c), (d) (West Supp. 1999).
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data pursuant to subsections (e) and (f) of the driver's license statute.
These subsections authorize the Department to disclose the data for
the litany of uses permitted by the Connecticut DPPA.
The Connecticut driver's license statute is misleading and it
masks the privacy policies of the state. The Connecticut legislature
has made a deliberate policy choice to permit personal information to
be disclosed in order to advance certain interests that, perhaps, inure
to the benefit of the general public. The state also generates revenue
through these disclosures. This policy choice, if properly aired, can
possibly be justified. However, the manner by which the state
effectuates its policies is deceptive. By asking people if they would
consent to the disclosure of their personal data, and then disclosing it
regardless of their responses, the state flaunts the trust of its citizens.
The disclosures do not advance goals that have been openly endorsed
by the public. Nor do such disclosures promote government
efficiency and fairness, as do FOIA disclosures. With the release of
these records, the State of Connecticut unjustifiably discloses
important personal information-including names, addresses, Social
Security numbers, and photographs-despite the express refusal of its
citizens.
4. Unauthorized and Downstream Uses of Data
Additional problems arise when publicly held information is
disclosed clearinghouse-style. States may agree to disclose personal
records in bulk for express and legitimate purposes. The records that
are disclosed, however, are valuable, and are readily resold for
secondary and unapproved uses. While the DPPA and its state law
counterparts set forth stiff penalties for unapproved uses of disclosed
records, enforceability is a major problem. Recent incidents
involving driver's license data illustrate the problem of specifying the
uses for which disclosures are permitted.
Image Data, a New Hampshire-based company, succeeded in
persuading a number of states to sell it copies of their driver's license
photos. Image Data explained that the photos would be used for a
nationwide credit fraud prevention system, whereby the images of
credit card holders would flash at checkout counters, allowing store
clerks to verify customers' identities. South Carolina sold the
company 3.5 million photos for $5000. Florida and Colorado signed
similar contracts. The Washington Post then reported that Image
Data was funded in part by the United States Secret Service, and that
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the photos were to be used to construct a national network to combat
terrorism and immigration fraud. 6  Upon this revelation, the
governors of Florida and Colorado blocked the sale of photos, and the
State of South Carolina sued for the recovery of its records.67 The
states reportedly had never been informed that the photos were to be
used for such a system, and had no knowledge that federal officials
were involved in the deal. Government data is exploited broadly over
the Internet. Companies such as TenantScreening.com employ public
data to offer landlords and other parties a method to learn the personal
histories of prospective tenants and others.68 Another company
compiles federal, state, and municipal data to provide employers with
background checks and other surveillance services for monitoring
prospective and existing employees.69 The reality is that government
databases have been widely appropriated by private firms. This
public data is being used not as a means for monitoring government,
but as a tool for investigating individuals. While the DPPA
enumerates the permissible private-sector uses of driver's license
data, no statutory exemption covers uses such as tenant screening and
employee monitoring. Clearly, the data used in these surveillance
applications have been transferred beyond the limited uses sanctioned
by privacy laws.
Non-FOIA disclosures can have valid policy goals. The
problem, however, is that data are readily and tacitly resold.
Governments have little ability to track downstream sales of data.70
Given the value of such databases, the rapid transferability of the
records, and the difficulty in tracking the subsequent uses,
governments should assume that downstream resale of personal
information will occur, and should generally refrain from disclosing
the information except for compelling purposes.
5. Data Origination Versus Data Verification
Solutions do exist to help reconcile people's interest in
66. See Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Liz Leyden, U.S. Helped Fund Photo Database of Driver
Ids; Finn's Plan Seen as Way to Fight Identity Crimes, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1999, at Al.
67. See id.; see also Robert O'Harrow Jr., South Carolina Cuts Ties to Driver Database,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 23, 1999, at E3.
68. See Tenant Screening Services Inc. (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<http://www.tenantscreening.com/>.
69. See McManigal Investigations (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://merlin.mwaz.com/pimac/website/Slide._3.htmi>.
70. Interview with Mitchell Pearlman, Executive Director, Connecticut Freedom of
Information Commission (May 20, 1999) (on file with authors).
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informational privacy with society's broader interest in facilitating
transactions. The problem with the current system for disclosing
driver's license records is that the disclosures are broader than need
be to effectuate the goals of the DPPA. For example, the DPPA
permits states to use driver's license data to verify third parties' data.71
States, however, need not disclose any personal data to fulfill this
role. It would be sufficient for the state to establish a data verification
system, possibly electronically, that would allow third parties to
check the authenticity of individual's representations. No information
would be released by the state other than a yes/no answer as to
whether the requestor's information is correct. In the event the data
do not coincide, this system would provide a preliminary notice to the
requesting party that the individual's data do not match public filings,
and that further inquiry as to the authenticity of the individual's
representations may be necessary. No information would be
disseminated to third parties, and the anonymity interests of
individuals would be protected.
C. Interagency Transfers
The current trend of database integration stands to revolutionize
current practices of information sharing between governmental
agencies. Governments can realize substantial improvements in
efficiency through data sharing by reducing the redundancy of data
collection and by preventing fraud on the government. Conversely,
such data sharing practices are likely to impinge on the personal
privacy and substantive rights of individuals.
1. Benefits of Data Matching
Governments commonly engage in a practice known as "data
matching" to detect and prevent fraud. Connecticut law gives broad
discretion to the Department of Social Services (DSS) and its
constituent divisions to match its data against the records of other
agencies. The DSS, for example, jointly maintains a database with
the Labor Department to track the employment contracts of recipients
of aid in its family assistance program. 2  Connecticut law also
authorizes the Child Support Enforcement Bureau (Bureau) of the
DSS to compare the records that it receives from "deadbeat" parents
with the records that are submitted by such parents to other
71. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1999); see also CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10(f)(A), (B), (G) (West Supp. 1999).
72. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-688b (West Supp. 1999).
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government agencies and to private institutions.73 The Bureau is also
mandated to enter into agreements with private financial institutions
to develop automated data matching systems to track the deposits of
deadbeat parents and submit such information to the Bureau on a
quarterly basis.7 4 The broad data matching authority of the Bureau
derives directly from the federal 1996 Welfare, Reform Act, which
confers such investigative powers upon the child support agencies of
all states.75
Governments have improved their fraud detection systems and
have generated significant cost savings through data matching
programs. The federal Department of Education recovered $3.4
million in delinquent loan repayments by matching its roster of
delinquent student loan debtors against records of federal
employees.76 The State of Texas, similarly, recovered over $600,000
in Medicaid overpayments in less than two months through its data
matching system. 77 Finally, the Province of Alberta discovers roughly
300 clients a month who overdraw benefits.78
2. Privacy Interests in Matched Data
Data matching gives rise to numerous concerns over privacy
interests and substantive rights. Privacy concerns generally stem
from a fear of the government having unrestricted power to employ
its data in the monitoring and surveillance of individuals, and from a
notion that the personal autonomy of individuals is violated when
their personal data is used for purposes other than those for which the
data was originally disclosed.79 Without a doubt, an individual's
interest in informational privacy is in tension with the public interest
in accurate decision-making and efficient policy implementation.80
Thus, the question arises whether governments should be permitted to
73. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-137 (West Supp. 1999).
74. See CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 17b-137(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
75. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 372, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
76. See Rubin E. Cruse, Jr., Note, Invasions of Privacy and Computer Matching
Programs: A Different Perspective, 11 COMPUTER L.J. 461,468-69 (1992).
77. See Creation of the Office of Investigations and Enforcement (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.hhsc.texas.gov/Pubslsemi_ann_997_to_398.htm>.
78. See Dr. Lyle Obert, Alberta Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With Ontario
(visited Oct. 22, 1999) <http:lwww.edLgov.ab.ca/acn/199803/5991.html>.
79. See Lillian BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BIu.L RTS. J. 455, 464-65,
468-69 (1995).
80. See id.
PUBLIC DATA AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
employ data for unconsented-to uses, and if so, what enforceable
restrictions can be placed upon public agencies from sharing data and
from taking action based on shared data.
One option would be to prohibit governments from using
personal data for unconsented-to uses. To be sure, such prohibitions
are in force in certain circumstances. Connecticut imposes strict non-
disclosure standards on HIV data8' and tax return data.82 But few
categories of data spark sufficient public interest to enact laws against
intra-governmental data disclosures. In the absence of statutory
prohibitions, some privacy advocates nonetheless argue that the
government should be prohibited from using data for unconsented-to
uses.83
This position is untenable. To restate the argument of Professor
Lillian BeVier, the government has legitimate interests for engaging
in non-consensual uses of personal data that outweigh the privacy
interests of individuals whose personal data might be shared84
Legitimate interests of the government are clear, as discussed above.85
Privacy interests of individuals, on the other hand, not only vary
widely from person to person,8 6 but they often trifle in comparison to
the wider goals of the public administration. Professor BeVier
suggests that the primary privacy interest sought to be protected by
banning such disclosures is to allow people the freedom of
informational anonymity.8 7  But it is not clear to what extent
individuals should be able to restrict public agencies from sharing
valid data with other officials. How, if at all, is an individual's
personal autonomy violated when an agency matches its data against
motor vehicle records? Should society recognize a privacy interest in
"deadbeat" dads attempting to hide their public employment contracts
from the child support enforcement bureau? To be sure, there may be
an affirmative notion of personal privacy that might be violated when
public officials share an individual's personal data. But when valid
data is shared between agencies pursuant to an officially endorsed
81. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-585(a) (West Supp. 1999).
82. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-15(a) (West Supp. 1999).
83. See Letter from Joseph Grabarz, President, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, to
Steven Carlson and Ernest Miller (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with authors).
84. See BeVier, supra note 79, at 475.
85. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. See Alan F. Westin, Privacy in America: An Historical and Socio-Political Analysis,
THE CoNNECTcuT FOUNDATION FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, INC., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC PoucY SYMPosIUM 155, 155-56 (1996).
87. See id.
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policy, the privacy interest of the individual appears inconsequential. 88
As one privacy expert noted, public data systems "would probably
fall apart if individuals were to exercise complete control over the use
of their personal information."8' 9
Some restraints on data sharing are essential. There is a vast
potential for public officials to abuse personal data, and the more that
data are transferred between agencies, the greater the risk of harm.
Some of the worst incidents of data theft stem from the behavior of
public employees with access to sensitive personal information.
Mitchell Pearlman, Executive Director of Connecticut's Freedom of
Information Commission, feels that the misappropriation by public
employees of state data poses one of the greatest hazards to personal
privacy.90 In Connecticut, for example, numerous employees of the
Labor Department were found to have leaked confidential salary data
of the president of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association
to embarrass him in the press during a union dispute.91 Workers at the
United States Internal Revenue Service have repeatedly been found to
snoop on confidential tax data, often selling the information to third
parties.92 And, an employee of the Federal Trade Commission was
convicted for credit card and mail fraud after accessing files
containing personal information and Social Security numbers? 3 Many
public employees abuse government data, and safeguards must be
implemented to constrain the flow of data to legitimate uses.
3. Federal Data Matching Law
Several statutes have been enacted at the federal level to remedy
privacy concerns related to data matching. These laws establish
important baseline principles for interagency data management at all
levels of government. The first major federal law directed towards
data privacy was the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), which,
among other things, established a prohibition on interagency
88. See BeVier, supra note 79, at 476.
89. Harry A. Hammitt, Integrating the Disciplines: An Analysis of the Proceedings, THE
CONNECrICUT FOUNDATION FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, INC., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM 155, 155-56 (1996).
90. Pearlman Interview, supra note 29.
91. See Jon Lender, Five State Employees Punished in Compter Snooping Case; Agency
Finds Evidence of hnproper Access to Confidential Records, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 28,
1995, at A3.
92. See Hershey, supra note 11.
93. See United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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disclosure of personal data absent the consent of the data subject.94
The Privacy Act, however, has been viewed as a "paper tiger" due to
the loopholes that negate its protections. 95 The most significant
loophole to the law is the "routine use" exception, which permits
agencies to share personal data when the disclosure is for a routine
use. This exception has been construed liberally, permitting transfers
for any "necessary and proper" function.96
In response to the apparent lack of controls imposed on
interagency transfers by the Privacy Act, Congress enacted the
Computer Matching Act of 1988 ("Computer Matching Act").97 The
Computer Matching Act established a more explicit set of guidelines
that govern the ways data may be shared between government
agencies, and the extent to which the agencies may take adverse
action against individuals based upon shared data. The Computer
Matching Act has proven difficult to administer and it is questionable
what practical effect it has had on the nature of interagency
disclosures.9" The Computer Matching Act does, however, establish
some fundamental principles of fair information practices that should
be adopted at the state level, where many of these issues have not
been as thoroughly confronted as within the federal government.
The Computer Matching Act provides for a number of
protections that are absent in Connecticut law. First, the Computer
Matching Act establishes due process standards that limit the extent to
which agencies can act based on matched data. 9 It recognizes the
technical shortcomings of data matching programs, in that data may
be improperly inputted, may be wrongly processed, may be outdated
and may produce "false positive" matches.t °  The Computer
Matching Act, therefore, prevents agencies from taking adverse action
against individuals unless the results of data matches can be
corroborated with firsthand data, or if there is a "high degree of
confidence" that the matched data is correct.101  The Computer
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1996 & West Supp. 1999).
95. See BeVier, supra note 79.
96. See Management of Federal Information Resources, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,730, 52,751
(1985).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1996).
98. See General Accounting Office, Computer Matching: Quality of Decisions and
Supporting Analyses Little Affected by 1988 Act; quoted in BeVier, supra note 79.
99. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1) (1996).
100. For a description of the technical difficulties of computer matching, see Roger A.
Clarke, A Normative Regulatory Framework for Computer Matching, 13 JOHN MARSHALL J.
COMP. & INFo. L. 585 (1995).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1)(A) (1996).
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Matching Act requires that individuals receive notice when benefits
are to be reduced or terminated based on matched data and that they
have a 30-day period to contest the findings. This provision is an
important safeguard against the wrongful deprivation of an
individual's substantive fights and establishes a sensible baseline for
the extent to which agencies can conduct their business through data
that they did not originally procure.
Second, the Computer Matching Act limits the extent to which
data can be transferred between agencies. It provides that data may
not be exchanged between agencies unless pursuant to an express
matching agreement. 102  Matching agreements, among other
requirements, must stipulate the purpose of the planned matches, 03
must describe the records that will be matched, 34 and must establish
procedures for notifying individuals if adverse action is to be taken
based on computer matches. 05 These provisions attempt to protect
the privacy interests of individuals by limiting the number of agencies
that can have access to personal data and by requiring that agencies
incorporate due process protections into their matching programs.
4. State Data Matching Law
Connecticut has data privacy laws that concern interagency
transfers of data.106 These laws require agencies to keep logs
recording when a person's data is disclosed to other agencies and
require agencies to permit individuals to inspect, verify and correct
personal data being stored by the government.0 7 Several important
provisions of the Computer Matching Act, however, are absent in
Connecticut.
Connecticut law has no provisions analogous to the federal due
process protections in data matching programs. 0 8 As such, agencies
are not required to rely on firsthand data before taking adverse action
against individuals. As more and more state agencies are interlinked
through the proposed state-wide data network, computer matching is
becoming an increasingly widespread practice throughout
Connecticut's government. It is important that such due process
102. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1996).
103. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(A), (B) (1996).
104. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(C) (1996).
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(D) (1996).
106. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-193 (West Supp. 1999).
107. See id.
108. See Letter from James Wietrak, Connecticut Department of Social Services, to Steve
Carlson (May 18, 1999) (on file with authors).
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protections be written into state data law to ensure that agencies take
adverse action only when acting on accurate data.
Connecticut law, moreover, does not mandate that data matching
programs be conducted pursuant to formalized matching agreements.
To be sure, Connecticut has adopted a number of provisions, either on
a general level or an ad hoc basis, that set a foundation for more
comprehensive data matching protections. Connecticut law does
provide that public records are the property of the procuring agency
and shall not be transferred except as authorized by law.'09 The law
also grants the Attorney General the authority to recover improper
transfers of data between agencies. 110 Connecticut law, however, does
not restrict interagency data transfers to those contexts specified
under formalized data sharing agreements, as mandated at the federal
level.
Connecticut's tax laws indicate the weaknesses of the state's
information technology systems and point to the need for restraint in
the use of data matching programs. State law allows the Tax
Commissioner to transfer tax records to other governmental agencies
for various purposes., The Tax Commissioner, however, retains the
discretion to refuse to transfer individuals' tax records when he or she
perceives that the receiving agency lacks adequate safeguards for
protecting the information.112 The statute is remarkably detailed in the
extent to which it stipulates the protections that the Tax
Commissioner may require to be in place before records are
transmitted.113 Tax data are arguably some of the most important data
109. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § ll-8b (1996).
110. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 11-8c (West Supp. 1999).
111. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-15(b) (West Supp. 1999).
112. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANI. § 12-15(e) (west Supp. 1999).
113. The statute, provides, in pertinent part that the Commissioner may refuse to disclose
tax records to any agency unless such agency or office shall have:
(1) Established and maintained, to the satisfaction of the commissioner, a permanent system of
standardized records with respect to any request, the reason for such request, and the date of
such request made by or of it and any disclosure or inspection of returns or return information
made by or to it; (2) established and maintained, to the satisfaction of the commissioner, a
secure area or place in which such returns or return information shall be stored; (3) restricted, to
the satisfaction of the commissioner, access to the returns or return information only to persons
whose duties or responsibilities require access and to whom disclosure may be made under this
section or by whom inspection may be made under this section; (4) provided such other
safeguards which the commissioner prescribes as necessary or appropriate to protect the
confidentiality of the returns or return information; (5) furnished a report to the commissioner, at
such time and containing such information as the commissioner may prescribe, which describes
the procedures established and utilized by such agency or office for ensuring the confidentiality
of returns and return information required by this subsection; and (6) upon completion of use of
such returns or return information, returned to the commissioner such returns or return
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held by the state and it is no surprise that highly restrictive policies
are in place with respect to the transfer of such records. The
thoroughness of the laws covering transfers of tax data, however,
suggests that the government's data sharing programs in other
contexts are less secure.
Data matching programs, when properly administered, can be a
boon to the efficiency of government. If misused, they can
compromise the due process rights of individuals and cause
immediate financial and reputational harm. The data handling laws of
Connecticut primarily address the risks to personal privacy that occur
when data is released directly to the public. Few provisions address
the implications of interagency disclosures. As Connecticut
transforms its system of databases into an integrated data network, its
laws must evolve with the technology. Due process provisions need
to be central to data matching plans and formal matching pacts need
to be drafted to ensure that personal data is only transferred through
proper channels.
V. CONCLUSION
The State of Connecticut is leading the country in its plans to
integrate its data handling technology. The plan is technically
ambitious, but proceeds upon data privacy laws of the past. The
state's current laws primarily address the disclosure of sensitive
pieces of data to the public. Connecticut law, however, sparsely
addresses interagency transfers of data and the extent to which public
information should be made available on-line. As the state rebuilds
its information technology system, so must it rethink its data privacy
laws.
This paper has put forth a number of suggestions on how to
improve Connecticut's safeguards for personal privacy in the digital
age. This paper, for one, advocates that prior to the posting of non-
exempt FOIA records on the Internet, strong procedural safeguards
need to be enacted to ensure that only valid and necessary data be
made available.
Furthermore, non-FOIA disclosures should be restricted to
release only data that is essential to publicly endorsed private
transactional interests. Connecticut's Driver's Privacy Protection
information, along with any copies made therefrom, or makes such returns or return information
undisclosable in such manner as the commissioner may prescribe and furnishes a written report
to the commissioner identifying the returns or return information that were made undiscIosable.
See id.
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Act, for example, should be reconfigured to limit the disclosure of
personal data when the state is merely verifying a third party's
information.
Finally, the State of Connecticut should modify its laws
regarding interagency data matching plans. Due process protections
should be implemented to prevent the government from taking
adverse action based on secondhand data. The law, moreover, should
require agencies to enter into formalized data sharing agreements,
limiting the extent to which personal data can be freely transferred
between agencies.

